

**WHAT PRICE SOVEREIGNTY?**  
**THE TWO FACES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE PARADOX OF POWER: A**  
**COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY AND GRAND STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED**  
**STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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Twenty years after the Cold War, is Atlanticism still relevant? Do the United States and Europe share a common security and defense vision? A comparison of the most recent official security strategies of the United States and the European Union highlights both a shared vision and divergent means in terms of national policies. What price sovereignty? The answer to this question holds the key to the future of the European Union and the future of Atlanticism. Without a strategy derived from a shared political vision capable of truly realizing a unified Common Security and Defense Policy for Europe and beyond, a divided set of states of Europe is a more likely outcome than a true European Union.

**INTRODUCTION**

Atlanticism dominated the security and defense policies of the United States and Europe for half a century after World War II. The close linkages that culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance had historical roots dating back to the founding of the American republic, however, and perhaps to the discovery of the New World itself. What is the contemporary impact of the historical relationship between the United States and Europe on the formulation, development, and execution of American and European security and grand strategies and thus foreign policies?<sup>1</sup>

Contention between the United States and Europe over grand strategy began with the birth of the United States and continues today. American grand strategy was born in a revolutionary war of independence from Britain, and ever since the Europeans have been reacting. Geopolitically, the broad outlines of an American grand strategy are historically clear, even if they were not always clear to the decision makers of any given era on either side of the Atlantic. The contrasting characters of American and European societies and the manifestations of American and European exceptionalism in international politics, economics, and culture help explain the advancement of American grand strategy and foreign policy.

A two-sided coin structurally underlies American grand strategy in its relationship to Europe. The colonists who revolted from Britain during the Revolutionary War self-identified as British and simultaneously as Americans in that they did not want *to be* different but only *to do* things differently. The United States was born out of an idea to do things differently, better than the Europeans, while still ethnically and culturally identifying as European. The corollary exists on the European side of the

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Atlantic as well. Europeans viewed Americans as ethnically and culturally descendent, though as an inferior variant. Both historically have and continue to simultaneously define themselves in relation to, and in opposition to the other. The American side of the coin is American exceptionalism, defined as a belief that the American way of life is better than any other way of life and will produce an ever better future, not just for Americans, but also for the entire world. America's attitude is in contrast to a European exceptionalism, defined as a belief that the European way of life is better because of past glories and successes. It is this underlying structural dynamic that causes the tension in American and European relations regarding American grand strategy and European reactions to it. American grand strategy sets the tone in the relationship because it focuses on the future, while the Europeans are always reacting to America's grand strategy because they focus on the past.

President Thomas Jefferson best exemplified an early manifestation of this dichotomy. Jefferson was "a connoisseur of European culture and science."<sup>2</sup> Yet, he claimed that, "the fate of humanity in Europe is most deplorable" and found European society "rotten to the core."<sup>3</sup>

If there is such a thing as American grand strategy, what is it? The United States began as thirteen rebellious colonies along the Eastern coast of North America. Its colonial status is the key to understanding the structurally defining two-sided coin of "we are one" and "we are other." Of all of the nations of the modern world emerging as nation-states from a colonial past, the United States alone retained a homogenous and shared identity with its European progenitors. Beginning as predominately Anglo-Saxons, and virtually eliminating the indigenous population, America, at the time of independence, was ethnically and culturally indistinct from Britain and by extension Europe. It was the idea of still *being* "European" but *doing* things differently that was the idea underlying the creation of the new American republic. In virtually all other cases, as colonialism made way for independent nation-states across the globe during the next two hundred years, it was either the indigenous people who regained control of their nation (most African and Asian colonies) or a new mix of colonial and indigenous peoples (Central and South American colonies). Only the United States retained a virtually shared concept of identity with its former colonial masters.<sup>4</sup> This shared context set the structural foundation for relations between America and Europe into which American grand strategy was born and developed.

The development and execution of American grand strategy and thus American foreign policy, and European reactions to it, are best understood as a structurally dynamic tension between American and European conceptions of identity. This tension between American and European exceptionalism, a tension over who defines "Atlantic" culture, impacts the character of the international system, both elucidating and setting the structural conditions for a shared culture and society of Atlanticism.

Despite varying national interests, the countries comprising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance shared a security strategy of opposing the Soviet Union. Twenty years after the

Cold War, is Atlanticism still relevant? Do the United States and Europe share a common security and defense vision? Do all the European Union countries even share a common security and defense vision?

A comparison of the most recent official security strategies of the United States<sup>5</sup> and European Union<sup>6</sup> highlights both a shared vision and divergent means in terms of national policies. American and European strategies are both at odds with each other and share the same fundamental outlook.

The United States and European Union share an engagement strategy. The United States balances capabilities for cooperation and coercion. On the other hand, the European Union focuses predominately on cooperation. Despite efforts at developing a Common Security and Defense Policy, the European Union hinders its own ability to develop coercive capabilities, necessary for successful implementation of cooperation, due to concerns of national interests and sovereignty. What price sovereignty? Without a strategy derived from a shared political vision capable of realizing a unified Common Security and Defense Policy for Europe, a divided set of states of Europe is a more likely outcome than a true European Union.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This analysis is primarily at the systemic level. By comparing and contrasting the most recent United States and European Union security strategies, it is possible to draw conclusions about a shared vision and differing means to achieve that vision. By process tracing the historical development of American grand strategy, it is possible to draw conclusions about the role of Atlanticism on the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

The initial examination explores the isolation and consolidation phase of American grand strategy in the Louisiana Purchase, Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, Mexican–American War, and Spanish–American War, leading to inevitable empire. Further exploration examines the transition period in President Franklin Roosevelt’s and other American diplomatic visions of Europe that transitioned America into a hegemonic position through engagement and empire via American economic and cultural exceptionalism. The final stage of American grand strategy becomes clear through a consideration of American diplomatic efforts in Europe during the twentieth century. A brief analysis of the historical role of European anti–Americanism expresses Europe’s response to America’s grand strategy.

This exercise highlights both the paradox within European strategy between a socially cooperative ideal, which is elucidated through a selected case study of the European Intermarium countries, and European geopolitical reality. A further discussion explores the price of sovereignty as an impediment to executing the full vision of a European grand strategy, highlighting the paradox of power between the United States and European Union security strategies. In conclusion, some observations are

offered regarding the future of Atlanticism, the future of potential further European Union political integration, and the potential for a new and shared grand strategy.

## **SECURITY STRATEGIES**

The security strategies of both the United States and European Union declare their official policies in terms of security and defense, and how their policies affect their interactions with the international community. A comparison of these official documents highlights the fundamental shared vision of the United States and European Union and the divergent means used to achieve that vision.

### **NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES**

The United States security strategy views the world from a competitive self-interest paradigm, but sets goals and a vision of a liberal world order. The United States commits to American leadership coupled with extensive partnerships to shape the international system and meet twenty-first century challenges. Taking a strategic approach to meeting its top national security priorities, the United States strategy focuses on enduring interests. These interests include: the security of the United States, its citizens, and United States allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing United States economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and an international order advanced by United States leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.<sup>7</sup> The United States seeks to advance security, prosperity, value, and international order interests. To advance its security interests, the United States will strengthen security and resilience in America, defeat extremist organizations around the world, reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons materials, advance peace and security in the greater Middle East, invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners, and secure cyberspace. To advance its prosperity interests, the United States will strengthen education and human capital, enhance science and technology, achieve balanced and sustainable growth, and accelerate development. To advance its value interests, the United States will strengthen the power of the American example, promoting democracy and human rights abroad and dignity by meeting basic needs. Finally, to advance its international order interests, the United States will ensure strong alliances, build cooperation with centers of influence, strengthen institutions of cooperation, and sustain broad cooperation on key global challenges.<sup>8</sup> The United States hopes to shape its vision of the world by pursuing comprehensive engagement and promoting a just and sustainable international order.

Underlying this central focus of cooperative engagement, a less emphasized, but no less relevant, second face of engagement exists – coercion or the use of force. It is the understated potential unilateral use of force that makes the cooperative face of engagement effective. The United States asserts that military force may at times be necessary to defend America and her allies to preserve peace and security

and to protect civilians in the event of a humanitarian crisis. This means credibly guaranteeing United States defense commitments with tailored deterrence capabilities, while helping allies to build similar capacities, to achieve regional and global security. Although the United States commits to exhausting all other options before war, the United States reserves the right to act unilaterally to defend the nation and American interests through the use of force.<sup>9</sup>

### **EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY STRATEGY**

The European Union sees its existence as proof of a transformation in the relationship between states that led to peace and stability in Europe. The European Union commits to peacefully settling disputes and cooperating through common institutions. The rule of law and democracy created a united and peaceful continent. The European Union sees this model as its vision for the world. Europe still faces threats and challenges, but Europeans see the future of conflict as an intra-state issue and not the traditional threat of state versus state warfare.<sup>10</sup>

The European Union focuses on realizing the promises of globalization. Thus, threats come from the developing world, where states seek to progress to levels of European Union integration. Because security is a precondition for development, a number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity, and poverty. These threats do not constitute large-scale aggression against European Union member states. Rather, they are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable threats. These threats include: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.<sup>11</sup>

The European Union does not take a strategic approach to meeting its top security priorities. The European Union fails to articulate any overarching priorities because there is no common consensus within the European Union on a shared strategic vision with associated enduring European interests. Instead, the European Union outlines some strategic objectives narrowly focused on addressing the outlined threats. The European Union dispenses with the traditional concept of self-defense against the threat of invasion, and posits the first line of defense abroad, advocating acting before crises occur.<sup>12</sup>

To achieve conflict and threat prevention, the European Union will build security along its borders in its near periphery and promote an international order based on effective multilateralism. The European Union will advance these policies by becoming more active in pursuing strategic objectives in a cooperative multilateral environment; by becoming more capable across the spectrum of the instruments of power; by more coherently articulating common foreign, security, and defense policies; and by working with partners in a cooperative multilateral environment.<sup>13</sup> In 2008, the European Union expanded some areas, but maintained the basic themes of 2003. The focus remains threat based: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organized crime, cyber and energy security,

climate change, and piracy.<sup>14</sup> The strategic objectives continue to focus on threat prevention by building stability in Europe and beyond through a more effective and capable Europe, a greater engagement with the European neighborhood, and partnerships for effective multilateralism.<sup>15</sup>

Conspicuously absent is any direct mention of military force as a means to achieve objectives. The European Union commits to improving military capabilities and to maintaining defensive alliances and relationships. The European Union makes little commitment, however, as to how, when, or if military force plays a role in advancing European Union strategic security objectives. In fact, the European Union seems committed to the idea that peaceful relations in Europe have the power to transform the developing world by example alone. Thus, any use of force is actually contrary to a strategy based on a paradigmatic example of peaceful resolution to disputes.

### **SHARED VISION – DIVERGENT MEANS**

Various interpretations of both security strategies are abundant in the literature.<sup>16</sup> Most of the recent work compares the 2002 and 2006 United States security strategies with the 2003 European Union security strategy and thus draws distinctly different conclusions as opposed to comparisons with the 2010 United States security strategy. The President George W. Bush Administration's focus on unilateralism and the preemptive application of force clearly diverged with the European Union's preference for multilateral approaches without an application of force. President Barak Obama's Administration reaffirmed the United States commitment to cooperative approaches, but still reserves the right for unilateral applications of force if deemed necessary.

Both the United States and the European Union share a vision of a liberal international world order based on engagement. They differ, however, on the means to realize that vision. Engagement has two faces: multilateral economic and security interdependence and cooperation, and expeditionary military intervention. The United States focuses on the former and utilizes the latter when necessary. It is the synergy of both, however, that is the driver for successful engagement. The potential threat of the latter is what makes the former more effective. The European Union focuses exclusively on the former and eschews the latter, making implementation of the former, outside Europe's borders, significantly more difficult. There are limits to the effectiveness of focusing predominately on soft power implements in the current security threat environment.<sup>17</sup> Despite the European Union's participation in several military operations, the European Union has no intention of developing a permanent option for the use of military force, such as a standing European Army.<sup>18</sup> The United States and the European Union differ in their perceptions on the use of force and the consequences of that differentiation have implications for the European Union's future.

These divergent views of the means to achieve a shared vision of engagement when applied in the context of examining multiple security strategies over the course of several years highlights a degree of futility when taking a snap shot in time to compare United States and European Union positions. Security strategies may change along with political administrations. To truly understand the level of convergence or misalignment between United States and European Union security strategies, the level of analysis must be taken to a degree higher, to the realm of grand strategy – geopolitical imperatives that remain relatively constant across time.

## **GRAND STRATEGIES**

To understand why the United States and European Union share a strategic vision but diverge in their perceptions of the means necessary to achieve that vision, it is necessary to view the strategic decision of whether to use force or not, and why, in any given scenario, in the context of grand strategy. Only by viewing the United States and European Union security strategies in this grand strategic context does it become clear why the United States and the European Union differ in their perceptions on the use of force and what the consequences of that differentiation might mean for the future of the European Union.

If there is such a thing as a grand strategy, what is it? The broad outlines of grand strategies are historically clear, even if they were not always clear to the decision makers of any given era. A grand strategy is rarely a declared element of national policy. Rather, it is a set of subconscious guidelines followed by successive governments regardless of ideology. American grand strategy developed in stages, seeking to achieve specific geopolitical imperatives, facilitated or ignored by European powers early on, though anti-Americanism throughout Europe was subconsciously aware of these geopolitical imperatives.

### **AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY PART I: ISOLATE AND CONSOLIDATE**

The future of the United States as a viable nation-state was never a sure thing. At the time of independence, France controlled the bulk of useful territory in North America, while the Spanish held colonies directly challenging a fledgling America. The United States had distinct advantages though. The European empires all viewed their New World holdings as secondary concerns to the distribution of power among states on continental Europe. Also, the United States did not face any severe geographical challenges. Thus, from the beginning, the United States had the potential for capital, food surplus, and physical insulation in excess of every other country of the world. This geopolitical reality set the tone for American grand strategy.

Early America was particularly vulnerable to Britain because the American economy, integrated into the British economy and trading with other European powers, required braving the British controlled sea-lanes. In addition, the coastal nature of the new republic made it vulnerable to incursions from sea



powers, as the War of 1812 demonstrated. To protect a coastal community from a sea power requires either a navy, which was too expensive for the United States in its first fifty years, or requires development of communities not dependent on the sea.

Thus, the first imperative of American grand strategy was strategic depth by dominating the greater Mississippi basin.<sup>19</sup> The United States solved this problem in phases: direct purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803; construction of the National Road in phases from Baltimore, Maryland to Jefferson City, Missouri by the 1840s; and establishment of the Oregon Trail opening up the West to settlement through 1869.<sup>20</sup> Collectively, these undertakings facilitated the largest and fastest cultural expansion in human history in less than seventy years, what the Americans termed a “Manifest Destiny.”<sup>21</sup> How it happened is equally important. Wave after wave of settlers moved inland from the coast farther and farther westward. All through this settling process, wealth assurance existed because of well-watered naturally connected lands via navigable rivers. This growth happened all in isolation. With the exception of the War of 1812, the United States did not face any significant foreign incursions during the nineteenth century.

The second imperative of American grand strategy was elimination of all land-based threats to the Mississippi basin.<sup>22</sup> The Canadians were a threat, facilitating the British logistically during the War of 1812. The British ended their involvement in that war due to exhaustion from the Napoleonic Wars, while the French interest remained the balance of power in Europe.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the geographically and culturally fractured Canadians, unable to match the potential of the United States in capital and food surplus, embraced a policy of political neutrality and economic integration with the United States. Thus, America secured its northern border.

The Napoleonic Wars not only absorbed British attention, but also shattered Spanish power.<sup>24</sup> The United States took advantage of this opportunity to gain control of Florida, while Mexico gained independence from Spain. The key to exploiting the potential of the Louisiana Purchase was control of New Orleans, and the biggest threat to that control was Mexico. Having secured their northern border, the United States turned its efforts south. First, America opposed Mexican power through settlement in the Texas territory, ultimately defeating General Santa Anna at the Battle of San Jacinto. Second, they attempted to demographically and economically dominate the Southwest. This two-part strategy came to a head in the 1846–48 Mexican–American War. The United States gained control of all the lands of Northern Mexico in the settlement ending that war.<sup>25</sup> Thus, America secured its southern border.

The United States achieved this second imperative with a minimum disruption to the American way of life, and without risking military conflicts with other countries further afield. Americans came to believe that America was a remarkably safe place with a “Manifest Destiny”.<sup>26</sup>

The third imperative of American grand strategy was to control the ocean approaches to North America.<sup>27</sup> In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine asserted that European powers could not form new colonies in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>28</sup> This was initially a bluff, as the Americans had no way to enforce this doctrine. In fact, the Monroe Doctrine was less a threat and more a statement of evident self-interest. With every year that passed, however, this American position became more solidified in the mindset of Americans and Europeans alike. Securing the Pacific was relatively easy after purchasing the Alaskan Territory from Russia in 1867. The Atlantic was more problematic. The British and Spanish still held many naval bases in the Caribbean.

In 1898, the United States launched its first overseas war, expelling the Spanish from Cuba in the Spanish–American War.<sup>29</sup> At the onset of World War II, the British needed more ships to maintain a blockade of the German controlled European continent to keep maritime supply lines open. America provided those ships as part of a Lend–Lease Program in exchange for almost all British naval bases in the Western Hemisphere – a culmination of Monroe Doctrine principles.<sup>30</sup> The deal for naval bases was a separate deal from the Lend–Lease Program. There was, however, a clear *quid pro quo* on these two issues between the United States and Britain. Thus, over fifty years, America secured its western and eastern borders.

How do these first three geopolitical imperatives constitute American grand strategy? How did this grand strategy affect America’s relationship with Europe? The United States resolved these strategic imperatives simultaneously over the first one hundred and forty years of the republic. A characterization of this resolution is, after over simplification with one word, isolationism. President George Washington set the tone for isolationism during his farewell presidential address when he warned against permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world and specifically against involvement in European wars and entering into entangling alliances in Europe.<sup>31</sup> Although scholars broadly define this concept as “isolationism,” the United States did not seek isolation from the larger world at its inception, or at any time afterwards. Isolation and consolidation was America’s wish to limit its political and especially its military commitments, and its belief that doing so would not prevent it from engaging with the rest of the world economically and otherwise. It is this tension between engagement and entanglement that defines American strategy before 1914, and even from time to time afterwards. “Isolationism” only becomes an idea when the concept itself becomes contested in the twentieth century.

For the new American republic to consolidate its identity and geopolitical power base, it was necessary to isolate itself from broader foreign involvement in order to focus on domestic issues. This required a population, initially ethnically and culturally Anglo–Saxon European, and further multi–ethnically European through waves of immigration during the nineteenth century, to focus on creating its own nation–state. America created its own nation–state based on a European ethnic–cultural identity

model, but more importantly on a new model, a bold experiment, of *doing* something different. Variants of this isolationist policy continued all the way through until the United States entered World War II.<sup>32</sup>

How these three grand strategy imperatives were met is important, especially for their impact in developing the American mindset. Life for the dominant Anglo–Saxon European culture in America improved measurably every year for more than five generations. Americans became convinced that this state of affairs was normal. They referred to this belief in ever increasing wealth and security as “Manifest Destiny” – a concept that posits the American way of life as something different from the rest of humanity.<sup>33</sup> That is, by 1898, Manifest Destiny defined American grand strategy. This sense that America is somehow better, destined for greatness, is at the heart of American self-identity, American exceptionalism, and is also at the heart of European anti–Americanism. Despite all of Europe’s immense cultural accomplishments over the last five hundred years, and its dominance of the globe in the age of colonial empires, the twentieth century saw the Americans surpass the Europeans at their own game. Ethnically and culturally the same, the Americans were ascendant because of their way of *doing* things, while the Europeans were in decline despite their historic accomplishments.

### THE TRANSITION

In the transition from American isolationism to empire, three worldviews elucidate the relationship between the United States and Europe. The American involvement in World War I began the process that ended isolationism by the end of World War II as a preeminent American foreign policy strategy with regards to Europe. There was no going back, but the question still remained as to how much interaction with Europe the United States should engage in going forward. The first worldview bridges this transition – partial internationalism. President Franklin Roosevelt best articulated this view as aiming at retiring Europe from world politics while avoiding American entanglement – a tricky proposition.<sup>34</sup>

President Franklin Roosevelt embodies the dichotomy between identifying as European ethnically and culturally and choosing policy quite different – the American “other” or different way of life. His early tours of Germany shaped Roosevelt’s view of Europe. Being the equivalent of an “American aristocrat,” he identified with the culture of an “Old Europe” with bucolic countryside scenes and aristocratic privilege.<sup>35</sup> His views of Europe changed, however, as totalitarianism took hold in the 1930s. He came to view American interests as in the interests of the world, while European interests were self-serving and destructive.<sup>36</sup>

Prior to World War II, according to James Harper, various actors in successive Roosevelt Administrations had competing views for how to handle “the European Question.”<sup>37</sup> First was a free trade concept that peace was good for business. Second was a proto–containment policy that ignored the Russians as a serious threat. Third was a Europhobic Hemispherism arguing for isolation, appeasement,

and Western Hemisphere hegemony. Finally was a progressive activism which advocated a negotiated peace before war broke out.<sup>38</sup>

President Franklin Roosevelt eventually adopted a policy completing the transition of the United States from isolationism to inevitable empire. He based his partial internationalism on several pillars, defining the transition and also highlighting the embodiment of the dichotomy with Europe – America and Europe as the same ethnically and culturally, but quite different in policy. These pillars include: articulate American exceptionalism as youth and virtue; reform the international system, but stay apart from it; safeguard American democracy via partial international interaction; deter Europe and if necessary coerce it; and exhaust all instruments of power other than military first.<sup>39</sup> His goal was less saving Europe from itself, as much as saving the rest of the world from Europe. This worldview informed Roosevelt's policies with respect to Europe during World War II. He continually sought to position America between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in order to keep the allied coalition together to win the war.<sup>40</sup> Roosevelt believed that this pragmatic approach, with the pillars of partial internationalism as the foundation, would only succeed with the United States taking the lead to reconcile the differences between competing European interests.<sup>41</sup>

Culminating the transition are two other worldviews. The second, articulated by George Kennan, is partial isolationism.<sup>42</sup> In reaction to the Soviet threat and the Cold War, this position called for restoring Europe's centrality and autonomy through temporary American engagement. Kennan's assumption was that normalcy is a state of peace with diplomats in charge. Because full engagement from a distance is not possible to contain the Soviet threat, he advocated an autonomous Europe and a self-contained United States to contain the Soviet Union and promote a more liberal regime in Russia.<sup>43</sup> This three-world policy planted the seeds for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a counter-balance to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites within an overall containment policy.<sup>44</sup>

The trajectory of inevitable empire began as part internationalism and part isolationism and merged in a third worldview of accommodating interventionism. Articulated by Dean Acheson, it established the United States as a permanent power in Europe based on the interests of both continents.<sup>45</sup> The "one" versus "other" dichotomy is again in play. The Europeans well understood the establishment of permanent power as empire, but the United States added its own twist and institutionalized their empire with soft power, convincing the Europeans that it was in their interests as well to accede to American dominance via economic interdependence.<sup>46</sup>

At first glance, any disparity between these three worldviews seems to obscure any unified view of the United States – Europe relationship. President Franklin Roosevelt argued for using a "big stick" to remake the world order and then leave Europe alone. Kennan pushed for working with the Russians to

sort out any differences. Finally, Acheson promoted transforming the relationship by leveraging Britain and France in an environment of shared interests.<sup>47</sup>

Any disparity in these worldviews only exists when seeing discrepancies between worldviews as grand strategies in and of themselves. If viewed as a transition in a larger context of American grand strategy, however, they become stages in American foreign policy development, shifting the United States from isolationism to engagement and inevitably to empire.

## **AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY PART II: HEGEMONY THROUGH ENGAGEMENT AND EMPIRE**

The fourth imperative of American grand strategy is to control the world's oceans.<sup>48</sup> The two world wars of the twentieth century, from the American perspective, cleared away the competition. Global history from 1500 to 1945 is a story of regional European powers becoming supra-regional empires. The Spanish, French, English, Austrians, Germans, Dutch, Polish, and Portuguese all had periods of relative strength where they extended control over huge tracts of territory. The two world wars massively devastated all of these powers. In 1945, only the United States remained, not only functional, but also thriving.

The United States immediately consolidated its newfound power by creating a global architecture of regimes to entrench its position. The foundational step was world naval domination. The terms on which America was able and required to engage a larger world kept changing, and so did the ideas of the United States about how to do it. American navalism was an early, and continually evolving, stage in the process by which the United States recognized economic interests as entailing strategic and thus military commitments. With the exception of the British, World War II destroyed every other navy of consequence in the world. Always a merchant marine power, the United States was able to bind its economic dominance with military control of all global trade routes. Economically devastated and without any significant naval presence, all European empires quickly collapsed.

In addition, the United States set up global currency regimes and international institutions that Europe had no realistic choice but to agree with to secure Marshall Plan funding for post-war reconstruction.<sup>49</sup> The foundation of this system was a global trading network based on export access to the only market still functioning, the United States, which only the American Navy could guarantee through dominance of the world's oceans. The Americans fused their economic and military policies into a robust global system that was in the interests of all major economies except the Soviet Union, despite American leadership and control. The Americans created a global system that inevitably could have no other outcome than American empire.<sup>50</sup>

## **THE IRRESISTIBILITY OF AN INEVITABLE AMERICAN EMPIRE**

Geopolitics was the foundation for establishing an American empire. To truly institutionalize American hegemony, however, required similar mechanisms of American exceptionalism on economic and cultural fronts. The siren song of America's vision of economic democracy eventually lured not only Europe, but also the rest of the world. As President Woodrow Wilson said, "American democracy of business would succeed in the struggle for peaceful conquest of the world."<sup>51</sup>

The Europeans were the progenitors of mercantilism. Thus, cementing American hegemony in Europe was only possible by overturning the European bourgeois commercial civilization and replacing it with the legitimacy of an American capitalist regime of mass consumption. The United States turned consumer culture into political power. It established an alternative to a foundering European society based on class distinctions rooted in feudal privilege with a way to meet and satisfy the societal demands of a decent standard of living while championing that standard for the entire world.<sup>52</sup>

The pillars of this American Market Empire are, according to Victoria de Grazia: nations have limited sovereignty over their public space, civil society paves the way for economic exports, best-practices rule as market norms, democracy of consumption based on equality of commonly known standards, and a peaceful market governs a "good life."<sup>53</sup>

Each pillar has its own story to tell. The service ethic exported to Europe, through civic society associations, cemented the idea that group association was achievable through classes of goods rather than classes of people. Socio-culturally, mass consumption achieved a leveling of social class distinctions. The foundation for this social revolution was the American exported idea of a "decent standard of living" first articulated by Henry Ford and eventually adapted by Europeans at large. The distribution practices, marketing maneuvers, and scientifically based corporate advertising of the Market Empire eventually translated into other realms of mass consumption as well, like the exportation of American Hollywood cinema culture that eventually supplanted the traditional art house cinema culture of Europe among the masses.<sup>54</sup>

These pillars girded transatlantic discourse between Europe and America, allowing the American consumer revolution to cause a social revolution in Europe, achieving American economic, and ultimately pop-cultural, hegemony to compliment American geopolitical hegemony. A combination of geopolitical and economic power ensured inevitable empire.

Economic dialog between Europe and the United States was possible because of common understandings developed during post-war reconstruction. In the case of Germany, how was this possible between bitter wartime enemies? Returning to the primary dichotomy, without an identity conception of "oneness" between the Germans and the Americans, the "otherness" of American consumer culture could never have taken root, let alone triumph, in Europe.

Culture and politics do not change independently.<sup>55</sup> During the post-war occupation of Germany, according to Petra Goedde, the power relationship between the two countries flipped in a matter of a few years.<sup>56</sup> The Americans perceived Germany as a war-prone male dominated society. Allied policy reflected this in non-fraternization orders, but American soldiers filled a void in German society created by a shortage of males. Extreme levels of fraternization that occurred between American males and German females feminized the American view of Germany to one of victim instead of aggressor. This feminization allowed for both Americans and Germans to move forward in their relationship without confronting the Nazi past.<sup>57</sup>

This socio-cultural phenomenon was only possible because American soldiers already had a conception of “one and the same” with the German people based on shared ethnic and cultural norms derived from America’s long tradition of German immigration. A similar pattern did not develop in post-war Japan without this shared context.<sup>58</sup> Not only did this long tradition of shared identity facilitate a thawing of American-German relations, it also opened up all of Western Europe to the forces of the American Market Empire during post-war reconstruction.

### **THE GRAND FINALE OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY**

The fifth and final imperative of American grand strategy is to prevent any potential challengers to American hegemony from rising.<sup>59</sup> The only possible challenger to America is a power continental in scope, with the necessary capital, food surplus, and physical insulation to compete with the Americans. Geographically, there are only two locations that could rival the United States in this way. One is South America and the other is Eurasia. Someday Brazil might unite the Southern Cone to rival American hegemony, but this is, as of yet, unachievable historically. On the other hand, any combination of domination or alliances between Russia, China, or major European powers to form a superpower is the only current threat to American hegemony. Thus, to achieve this final imperative of its grand strategy, America has to ensure the division of Eurasia among as many different (preferably hostile) powers as possible.

How do these final two geopolitical imperatives constitute American grand strategy? How does this continuing grand strategy affect America’s relationship with Europe? The resolution of these two final imperatives continues to evolve since 1945, summed up as, after over simplification with one word, engagement, taking two forms. First, the United States grants benefits to as many states as possible for not joining any alliance system hostile to American interests. Bretton Woods was the economic part of this effort.<sup>60</sup> Global economic interdependence with the United States makes it impractical for most European states to side against American policies. The military part of this effort is a series of bilateral military relationships uniting states under the American security umbrella. The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization alliance is the most prominent of these efforts. During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance bound Western European powers together with the United States to blunt the only serious attempt at Eurasian hegemony since 1945 – the Soviet Union.<sup>61</sup>

This two-pronged approach, economic and security interdependence and cooperation, was an outgrowth of America's, and Europe's, experiences after World War I. Feeling wholly unprepared for the rigors of international diplomacy that concluded that war, the United States passed the Rogers Act establishing the State Department as a professional bureaucracy instead of an "old boys club."<sup>62</sup> The relationship with Europe became a geopolitical project, multilateralism, to link all of the continental powers to an interdependent whole rather than a model of balancing individual powers. Europe became conceivable as a unitary project, and America was the honest broker encouraging Europeans to look beyond their parochialism. Issue management became the tactical weapon. Collective security was the strategic goal and was achievable through the promotion of shared goals on a series of transnational issues.<sup>63</sup>

American diplomacy toward Europe throughout the twentieth century reflected this strategy. The American style of diplomacy reflects the central dichotomy. American diplomats both resented and admired Europe at the same time. They took on the cultural characteristics of the European elite, consular activities, but in issue areas their diplomacy was one of professionalism promoting the interests of the United States.<sup>64</sup> Opposed to the ever-present threat of military power via coercion, especially after World War II and into the nuclear age, the light touch of American diplomacy was the "good cop" to the American military's "bad cop."

Throughout the twentieth century, European specialists in the State Department and diplomats abroad maintained a continuity of vision for America's relationship to Europe. America and Europe were essential parts of a single community of Atlantic cooperation, not rivals or one a savior of the other.<sup>65</sup> This policy of Atlanticism melded perfectly with American grand strategy. It also complemented the British strategy of keeping British interests closely aligned with America's interests. It prevented a Eurasian challenger to American hegemony from arising in two ways. First, by encouraging security cooperation and economic interdependence between European states, it discouraged a single great power from attempting European continental dominance, as France had during the nineteenth century and Germany during both world wars, by making the benefits of interdependence and the costs of solo action greater. Second, it generated enough cooperation through engagement that a single inter-related Atlantic community between Western Europe and the United States, manifested as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, could prevent the Soviet Union from becoming a Eurasian hegemon. Based on their shared experiences during World War II, European strategy wanted the future involvement of the United States in European affairs. The success of Atlanticism in realizing these two missions, and achieving victory in



the Cold War, was possible because of a shared Euro–American ethnic–cultural identity of “oneness” coupled with policy visions based on American “otherness.”

If the first form of engagement is cooperation, then the second form is empire. The second strategy for keeping Eurasia from uniting is direct American expeditionary military intervention. Repeated American military intervention across the globe established or preserved a balance of powers to prevent any singular dominating power in Eurasia. American involvement in World Wars I and II prevented German hegemony. Occupation of Western Europe during the Cold War, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, all limited Russian power. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan prevented al Qaeda from achieving hegemony in its recreation of the Caliphate. Expeditionary military intervention is expensive and difficult compared to cooperation. Thus, American grand strategy seeks to work through alliance structures first and resort to direct military intervention last.

President Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles began this focus on alliance structures in 1953, building not only the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but also close ties with ANZUS, Japan, and other alliance relationships. Under President George W. Bush’s administration, however, America abandoned this pillar of its grand strategy by advocating a policy of preemptive military engagement to deal with potential threats to the security of the United States. The Iraq War begun in 2003 was a result of this policy shift, with a pan-European reaction vehemently opposed to this blatant display of American unilateral military hegemony as a threat to world peace.

Only an empire is capable of power projection on this scale. The United States fulfilled the potential of its capital, food surplus, and physical insulation by realizing the first three geopolitical imperatives of its grand strategy through isolation during the nineteenth century. The American geography thus structurally dictated the inevitability of an American empire as America continues to meet its final two grand strategy imperatives. The availability of land, labor, and capital each fuel all economic activity. All of these areas indicate that the United States has decades of growth ahead of it. Without a Eurasian superpower capable of matching it, the inevitable American empire is likely to continue its hegemony for decades to come.

The major differences between the American and European empires is emblematic of the dynamic of an old Europe reflecting on its achievements of the past and a new America, doing something different and looking to the future. The basis of European empires was extraction, thus they were never sustainable in the long run. European cultural hubris was a European exceptionalism that believed in a superiority of Europe as a people and thus allowed for the exploitation of colonial possessions. On the other hand, American exceptionalism believes that Americans are not better as a people, but rather have a better way of life. America exported this way of life to the world through its political democracy and free market economy. Where the European empires sowed the seeds of their own destruction by exploitation

of those they came into contact with, the inevitable American empire seeks to uplift the world to enjoy the same standard of living that Americans do. It is often self-serving and hubristic, but it is also the most sustainable model of empire the world has ever known. Just ask anyone wearing blue jeans and Nikes, and drinking a Diet Coke at a McDonalds in London, Paris, or Berlin. Globalization, however, challenges concepts of national sovereignty and power for everyone, including the United States.

### EUROPE'S LAMENT: ANTI-AMERICANISM

Although the American empire was inevitable, American hegemony certainly was not. In fact, a significant counter-cultural discourse from Europe in opposition to the United States, known as anti-Americanism, has continuously sung a European lament over America, beginning with the discovery of the New World and displaying resurgence in the last decade.

Anti-Americanism has deep roots in European culture, especially French culture, based on identities of self and other.<sup>66</sup> Thus, it says more about the self-image of European countries than it does about the American condition. Its foundation is a set of values constructing national identities. It springs from a European exceptionalism. France was its progenitor, as the vanguard of the Enlightenment. France viewed the New World as a *tabula rasa* on which it could project its conceptions of the Enlightenment, but from the beginning, the New World did not comply. Its animals, landscape, and inhabitants did not conform to the French vision. Thus, European elites contemptuously viewed the new experiment that was the United States of America as something inferior to the way they conceived of society.<sup>67</sup> France was and is by no means alone. Anti-Americanism is just as potent in the rest of Western Europe, with unique flavors based on national identities.<sup>68</sup> They all share the same lament, however, at the core.

As the *Ancien Regime* collapsed throughout the nineteenth century, European intellectuals projected their anxieties about transformations in their own societies onto a derision of America. Not able to accept their own shortcomings, the European elite and intelligentsia poured their fears into Anti-American derision. However, the shocking defeat of a European power in the Spanish-American War changed the discourse.<sup>69</sup> Although many in Europe also knew that Spain was a hollow shell in terms of its power projection capabilities. No longer simply derision, Anti-Americanism became a European lament. As the inevitable American empire was on the rise, European empires were in decline. It took two world wars to bring this process to a tipping point, but the potential of America's New World geography eventually came to fruition.<sup>70</sup>

Anti-Americanism throughout the twentieth century was a long song of lament, a great societal denial of geopolitical reality, and an expression of European exceptionalism based on a glorified past in denial of the reality of an American exceptionalism of the present and inevitable future. Europe and

America share an ethnic and cultural identity, but also two very distinct ways of *doing* business. The European model failed, at the hands of the Europeans themselves, beginning with the French Revolution, because its basis is the Divine Right of Kings – simply being European meant a preordination as better than the rest of the world. Interaction with the world thus manifested as exploitation. The American model is succeeding because its basis is Manifest Destiny – originally conceived of by Americans about their own relationship to the North American continent, but eventually globally exported – a relationship of all people to the inherent rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all.

Despite the clear successes of the American model and vision for globalization, undoubtedly numerous historical examples of contradictions also exist between this rhetorical America ideal and Realist American foreign policy behavior as seen in the dichotomy between the American analytical and ideological tradition approaches to American foreign policy.<sup>71</sup> A similar dichotomy exists between American humanitarian urges and supporting self-determination, and American secular, economic, and ideological expansionist foreign policies.<sup>72</sup> In either case, as a European response, Anti-Americanism is a great European lament of the victory of freedom brought to the world by the example of the American way of life, and importantly, not brought by the European way of life.

### **SUMMARY**

The pull between the two faces of unilateral military engagement and multilateral cooperative engagement is the foundation of American grand strategy. The United States maintains its legitimacy when using force because it uses force as a last resort after the exhaustion of all other efforts of cooperation. Similarly, its cooperative multilateral efforts are more effective because it maintains the capability and threat of using force. European grand strategy on the other hand, if it exists, clearly focuses on the cooperative face of engagement alone.

### **A EUROPEAN GRAND STRATEGY?**

United States grand strategy seeks to prevent any regional hegemon from rising through a combination of multilateral engagement and direct expeditionary military intervention.<sup>73</sup> The European Union in its current form is only slightly over twenty years old and is also predominately an economic union that is dabbling with political union. Given that short time span and lack of political homogeneity, is it even possible to articulate a grand strategy for the entire European Union?

If the European Union has a grand strategy, its foundation is a clear choice that multilateral engagement is the preeminent tool for solving major strategic problems. In fact, the European Union itself is a collective security community – an environment where the use of force itself to resolve disputes is unthinkable. The European Union is extremely successful in maintaining collective security, with a

foundation of American security commitments. Peace on the continent of Europe is the first and primary geopolitical imperative of the European Union.

Once peace is secure in Europe, then the second geopolitical imperative of the European Union is an attempt to remake an international liberal world order based on effective multilateral engagement, with the European Union as the example for the global community to emulate, to achieve the ultimate vision of world peace. The potential of a “real” collective defense community in Europe as a force for good in the world is debatable.<sup>74</sup> Lacking full political integration the European Union is only marginally successful at exporting its strategy beyond the boundaries of Europe, due to the diverging national interests, and differing conceptions of multilateralism, among its member states.<sup>75</sup>

The German position is an uncritical preference for all kinds of multilateralism, a foreign policy of unrelenting diplomacy and a distain for the use of military force.<sup>76</sup> The French view links to the French conception of an international order shaped by balance of power politics and a notion of France’s exceptional status. France views multilateralism through the lens of whether it advances or hinders France’s quest for an exceptional role in world political decision making.<sup>77</sup> Despite rhetorical similarities, these two key European Union power brokers diverge in their conceptions of multilateralism. The divergent national interests of twenty-seven member states generate enough shared conception of multilateralism to meet the first geopolitical imperative and keep the peace in Europe, but not enough convergence to project a common political vision of Common Security and Defense Policy to make significant progress in achieving the second geopolitical imperative outside the boundaries of Europe.

Perhaps the best way to demonstrate both the successes and failures of these strategic principles is to look at a specific case where the ideal of an European Union collective security community was successfully embraced in the face of security concerns, and then turn to the prospects for continued European Union idealism in the face of European geopolitical reality.

### **CASE STUDY: THE INTERMARIUM**

The line of countries running from Poland in the North through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and into European Turkey in the South occupy the borderland ~ the Intermarium ~ between Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodox Christianity. This borderland, stretching from the Baltic to Black Seas, is a continual battleground of multiple competing empires. This competition between great powers over this Intermarium exhibited various permutations over the centuries.<sup>78</sup> The Cold War was the last such confrontation between Soviet Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. The string of countries in question was firmly in the Soviet sphere during the Cold War. Currently, these countries are all sovereign again for the first time in many decades.

Their post–Cold War relative peace and security, however, appears fragile. This borderland is in flux again with the resurgence of Russia, Germany recalculating its strategic options, and the European Union undergoing substantial political and economic stress. This borderland appears to be entering a strategic environment once again where states will have to make choices regarding mitigation of their traditional national security threats. What are their prospects for regional collective security cooperation within this current geopolitical environment?

The conclusion of World War I created a vastly new architecture for this region and laid the groundwork for repeated confrontations over the next century. The collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, a republic replacing the German empire, and the Soviet Union replacing Russia, allowed for the emergence of several independent nations in this region. The borders of these new nations became fixed at the Treaty of Versailles.

The key to the new arrangement was Poland, which reemerged as a sovereign nation. With the defeat of Germany, the Soviets tried to reclaim a part of the territory that they ceded in 1917 by invading Poland in 1920. Polish General Josef Pilsudski stopped the Russians at the Battle of Warsaw. Both Russia and Germany were in shambles, but Pilsudski knew his history and knew that they would be back. He wanted a prepared Poland. He had a vision of an alliance in place before Germany and Russia reemerged, an alliance of the countries in the borderland between these two great powers: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Finland, and the Baltic States. He called it the Intermarium.<sup>79</sup>

Poland was never able to secure this alliance. German-Russian entente in 1939 tore Poland apart, resulting in lost sovereignty for fifty years. The specter of a repeat is a Polish nightmare. Thus, is a similar alliance today possible before Germany and Russia reemerge?

An alliance between these countries makes a logical sense, but not a historical one. This borderland has always been a battleground for other, greater powers. It has never allied together to determine its own fate. In some sense, the matter is out of the Intermarium's hands. Their fate has always been bound up with what Russia and Germany decide to do. Neither of these nations would sit idly by while an Intermarium alliance formed. The United States is also unlikely to be enthusiastic about such an alliance. In that case, can these countries mitigate their shared security threat by other models of regional collective security cooperation?

Relying on common security institutions like the United Nations seems a stretch. History shows that the League of Nations was unable to guarantee their sovereignty during the inter-war period. The United Nations can shape international norms of behavior, but it has no real mechanism to enforce compliance without relying on the military power of member states. Relying on this mechanism might be a defense strategy for a nation unlikely to fall victim to an aggressor. It is not, however, a rational choice for a borderland country with a history of repeated incursions by aggressors.

Security regimes impact every country in this borderland. Some have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union in the post-Cold War era and actively engage in multilateral military cooperative regimes. The evidence suggests that actively engaging with security regimes is an element of meeting their national security needs, although it is not sufficient on its own.

From a competitive self-interest perspective, creating a collective security community seems the least viable possibility. Surrounding great powers historically dominated these countries. Their historical understanding is not one of enmeshment in relationships based on expectations of a lack of conflict. Repetitive war is their experience, not repetitive peace. Most are turning a blind eye, however, to this way of thinking and linking their security to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Their construction of perception seems to be driving their decision-making rather than their geopolitical reality – why? A sample process tracing of events in a few of these countries as examples is illuminating.

## **ROMANIA**

Others always dominated Romania's fate. It is a nation divided by geography, a nation for a long time, but rarely a united nation-state. Caught between competing empires in the nineteenth century, Germans and then the Soviets in the twentieth century dominated Romania. It maintained a degree of autonomy during Soviet rule through the oppressive regime of Ceausescu.

Romania emerged from seventy years of catastrophe, with a belief, like the rest of Eastern Europe, that redemption lay in the West's multilateral organizations to meet their security needs. "Romanians yearned to become European simply because being Romanian was too dangerous."<sup>80</sup> Romania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.

The recent European Union financial crisis hit Romania hard. Examinations show that Romanians are benefitting substantially from neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nor European Union membership.<sup>81</sup> However, they remain committed to both because they have no real strategic alternative. Romania affirms its modernity and democratic institutions through these memberships, in stark contrast to its tragic past.<sup>82</sup> They choose the psychological comfort of an illusory European protective security umbrella over their strategic and economic geopolitical reality. It's simply too soon, after decades of domination, for Romanians to see that they have the ability to take their national security into their own hands.

This perception of a security community makes sense until war comes. In this borderland, "the coming of war has been the one certainty since before the Romans. It is only a question of when, with whom, and what your own fate will be when it arrives."<sup>83</sup> The Romanians believe they will be secure by becoming a part of the European security community.

## **POLAND**

The Polish experience is a history of tragedy and betrayal. Located in the center of the great Northern European plain, Poland is the heart of this borderland. Poland has never been the master of its own fate. Caught in a vice between Germany and Russia, whenever those two great powers join forces, Poland loses its independence.

Poland looks to the European Union as its salvation. Its membership, along with Germany in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, takes one side of the vice out of the equation. However, Germany is reevaluating its role within the European Union. German – Russian cooperation is on the rise, especially in the energy sector.

Poland recognizes this, but feels somewhat helpless, resigned to their history of centuries of occupation and dismemberment. They are betting on a strategy that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union will not fade away to irrelevance and that ties to the global hegemon, the United States, will be enough to dissuade any German – Russian gestures toward future conquest. They recognize that their constructed collective security community may be an illusion now, with hopes of the reality of a collective security community in the future, but it really is their only strategic alternative.<sup>84</sup>

## **DISCUSSION**

What accounts for this strategy of belief in a constructed perception of a collective security community where one clearly does not exist, at least not yet? What accounts for this optimism when history tells these countries that they have and always will be in a borderland and thus they should prepare for war rather than banking on a perpetual peace?

Despite the conventional wisdom that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization outlived its purpose and lost its effectiveness, and that the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy lacks capability, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is morphing beyond a military alliance to join the European Union as a vehicle of regional security cooperation. The relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union lie in their power as security management institutions, managing security regimes.

Alexandra Gheciu takes an institutional approach to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union as agents of socialization.<sup>85</sup> Through military and educational interactions with post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union project a particular set of democratic norms of security into the former Eastern bloc. Through this exercise of power, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union shaped the perceptions of these countries and how they should interact with the world.<sup>86</sup> Through case studies of

Romania and the Czech Republic, Gheciu shows how North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union education and persuasion efforts even affected these countries' definition of national identity and national interests.<sup>87</sup> Following interactions with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, these societies redefined their conceptions of norms for correct governance, repositioned their self-interest in the international arena, and conceptualized their domestic and international goals within the framework of a liberal-democratic identity.<sup>88</sup>

The Western European allied view that liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is good for stability across all of Europe is driving this socialization process.<sup>89</sup> The Cold War ended over twenty years ago. By European standards, post-Cold War period organizations, like the European Union in its current form, are extremely new institutions. In countries where populations still debate historical defeats hundreds of years ago, these countries believe that the European Union "is a permanent and stable foundation for their future."<sup>90</sup> This contradicts rational accounts of the actual strength of the European Union. This paradox between the historical experience of a thousand years of insecurity and conflict, and confidence in an institution slightly over twenty years young, demonstrates the power of perceptions in the face of traditional threats.

Despite failed attempts at alliance building, history suggests that resurrecting attempts at an alliance structure in this Intermarium borderland is the best option to mitigate national security threats with regional security cooperation. The countries involved, however, opted for the security community of the European Union, where these countries choose to perceive that the use of violence to settle disputes is obsolete, even when the historical record suggests otherwise. It takes longer than twenty years to create the reality of a security community, yet apparently the perception of a security community is possible to create in a much shorter length of time.

Perhaps the cumulative experience of World Wars I and II and the Soviet domination collectively created an atmosphere that the 'war to end all wars' supposedly created, but ultimately did not. In the case of the Intermarium, an illusion of perceived collective security is better than the reality that these countries fate is ultimately not in their own hands, as history would suggest. They put their hopes in willing a collective security environment into existence. The collective trauma of continual conflict in this Intermarium borderland is too much to overcome. Ultimately, they are basing their calculations on a gamble on the endurance of the European Union as an institution. The current European Union financial crisis calls this gamble into question for many of these countries and they are now beginning to reevaluate their security arrangements.



## EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL REALITY

The European Union strategic culture of negotiation, diplomacy, commercial ties, international law, and multilateralism are a rejection of its own past, specifically European warfare during the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>91</sup> The first European Union geopolitical imperative is peace on the continent. Europe conceived of the European Union, and it still exists fundamentally, for the purpose of containing the hegemonic ambitions of Germany. The idea was to “tame” Germany through integration as a prerequisite for peace on the continent. The success of this abandonment of power politics within Europe is perhaps “the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved.”<sup>92</sup>

For the continued success of the European Union, however, it is clear that German leadership of the European Union is essential – a paradox of history since Europe invented the European Union to contain Germany. The heart of Germany’s problem is its indefensible location in the middle of the North European plain. With no natural barriers, Germany lacks strategic depth. Germany’s position provides enormous commercial opportunities, but also forces it to participate vigorously in conflict both as instigator and victim. Germany’s vulnerability makes it an extremely active power. It competes with everyone in times of peace and fights everyone in times of war.<sup>93</sup>

The European Union is an attempt by Germany’s neighbors to grant Germany security based on the theory that if everyone is in the same club, Germany will not need a threatening military. The catch is that a demilitarized Germany focuses its substantial energies and power on economic development, creating “one of the richest, most technologically and industrially advanced states in human history,”<sup>94</sup> and perhaps the inevitable leader of a union based on economic integration.

The changing threat environment is slowly eroding the idea of European collective security as the individual national security interests of European Union member states are diverging. The impact of diverging national security interests among European Union member states on the cohesion and further development of European security cooperation suggests several potential outcomes.<sup>95</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s enlargement to the Baltic States combined with pro-Western Georgian and Ukrainian color revolutions jarred Russia into a resurgence, which is causing Central Europe to recalculate its threat environment. By contrast, France and Germany do not want another Cold War splitting the continent. Add to this threat environment the severe European economic crisis, and it is clear to all that Germany is emerging as the political leader of Europe.<sup>96</sup>

Germany wants to use the crisis to reshape the European Union in its own image. France wants to preserve a key role in the European Union’s leadership. The Intermarium is watching nervously, as Germany grows closer to Russia over energy issues. The British, historically suspicious of Germany, want to reaffirm security links with the United States. At the heart of the European Union is a lack of political will based on divergent national interests and threat perceptions of its member states.<sup>97</sup> Given

their inherently divergent core interests, will this new threat environment galvanize the European Union to continue to sacrifice sovereignty for even greater political integration and Common Security and Defense Policy or will the European Union begin to fragment into regionalism based on conflicting core national interests?

The Central European corridor, the Intermarium, appears poised to be the new chessboard in United States – Russian competition. During the Cold War, Germany was this chessboard, but now Germany is free to return to its historical position at the center of European affairs. Thus, Germany does not have the same threat perception of Russia that the Intermarium states do. An alliance that fails to consolidate around a unified threat perception will not be effective for long.<sup>98</sup> Thus, can European Union Common Security and Defense Policy still meet the needs of its Central European member states?

The Intermarium wants to counter Russian resurgence and understands that it cannot rely on Germany. Thus, these nations are trying to maintain the engagement of the United States as much as possible. These countries are also turning to regional political and military alliances, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, as alternatives if the engagement of the United States is not forthcoming. The Visegrad Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) and the Nordic-Baltic Grouping, although loosely affiliated, are working to formalize military components. A Visegrad Battlegroup under Polish command hopes to stand up by 2016, and the Nordic Battlegroup is moving toward better serving the national interests of the Intermarium and Nordic countries.<sup>99</sup>

The growing rift between Western and Central Europe looks headed to a crisis as the Central European countries, the Intermarium, tries to avoid becoming the buffer zone between Russia and the West. The overall balance will depend on Germany and the extent to which it is willing to see the Intermarium draw in a United States military presence. Germany no longer wants to see a continent dominated by the United States now that it has the political and economic power to command the region. Nor does Germany want to see a resurgent Russia. Germany could use the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union to stall this process, though it would cause an identity crisis in both institutions.<sup>100</sup>

The problem remains, as powerful as Germany is alone (or partnered with France), Germany does not approach the power of the United States or China, or even Brazil or Russia in the future. The only way for Germany to matter in the long run is for Europe as a whole to matter.<sup>101</sup>

### **WHAT PRICE SOVEREIGNTY?**

The fundamental question the European Union is not asking is how the European continent is to be ruled in the twenty-first century? What price sovereignty? European Union strategy must answer this

question, but it is not. The European Union is caught between an ideal of collective security for the Union and a geopolitical reality of divergent national interests among its member states. Europe emerged from its subservience during the Cold War, gaining independence by default as both superpowers retreated – Russia withdrawing after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Americans shifting focus to the Middle East after 11 September 2001. The European Union accomplished significant reforms, but it continues to dabble with the fundamental question of political integration, even as it further integrates economically.<sup>102</sup>

Closer unification and some sort of “United States of Europe” seems like the obvious solution to the current financial crisis. Europe’s history and geography, however, favor fragmentation. The Europeans share economic interests, but there is no agreed upon perception of an external threat. When someone fires the first shot, however, geopolitical reality comes to the forefront.

Regionalization of European security organizations is on the rise – the Visegrad Group and the Nordic–Baltic Grouping are examples. Germany and France are showing an accommodationist attitude toward Russia, and the Intermarium is making alternative arrangements, which bodes ill for the European Union. A monetary union cannot graft onto security disunion. Taxation is a basic component of sovereignty and European Union member states will not share it with countries that do not share their political, economic, and security fate.<sup>103</sup> Regional organizations of like-minded blocs are forming – a German sphere of influence, the Nordic Bloc, Visegrad, and the Mediterranean. Britain maintains its strong ties to the United States and its traditional balancing of powers on the continent, while France is moving into the German sphere in an attempt to hold onto some measure of influence in Eurozone policy.<sup>104</sup> The alternative to this regionalization is clear German leadership underwriting both economic and political European integration. The question is whether Germany is willing to pay the price to be the hegemon of a united Europe by funding economic bailouts and standing up to Russia. Germany seems to be willing to do the former, but it appears indecisive in deciding whether its relationship with Russia or with Central Europe is more important. The fate of the European Union hangs in the balance. Without a coherent understanding that all states of Europe share the same fate, the current financial crisis is likely to trigger further regionalization rather than deeper unification. Germany holds the key to solidifying European Union strategy – an ideal of collective security that transforms into a politically integrated reality, or to not only a lack of strategy, but also to a potential dissolution of the European Union as a geopolitical reality. “The cost of making Europe work is German leadership that does not come at the end of a gun.”<sup>105</sup>

## **THE PARADOX OF POWER**

The paradox of power is that the United States and European Union strategies are foundationally compatible and in conflict simultaneously. The current imperative of United States strategy is to prevent any potential challengers to American hegemony from rising – which includes a European regional hegemon. At first glance, the European Union would appear to be just such a regional hegemon. The first imperative of European Union strategy, however, is to prevent any European hegemon from rising, by integrating all of the powers of Europe through multilateral interdependency, and thus keeping the peace on the continent. Thus, both the United States and European Union strategies of engagement achieve this end. By combining both faces of engagement, multilateral economic and security interdependence and cooperation, with expeditionary military intervention, the United States hopes to prevent any regional hegemony from rising, anywhere in the world, including in Europe. By focusing on multilateral economic and security interdependence and cooperation, and eschewing expeditionary military intervention, the European Union also hopes to prevent a regional hegemon from rising in Europe and disturbing the peace on the continent.

Because the United States is a global player, however, the costs of that global interaction are enormous. Thus, the United States favors a future European Union with more robust military capabilities to contribute to the burden sharing in helping to create their shared vision of a liberal world order. The European Union needs a Common Security and Defense Policy with more robust capabilities in order to achieve its second strategic imperative and remake an international liberal world order based on effective multilateral engagement. Inadequate European Union hard power capabilities limit the effectiveness of European Union Common Security and Defense Policy.<sup>106</sup> This is where the paradoxical divergence emerges. Continued European Union political integration is the only way to truly solidify a Common Security and Defense Policy for Europe, but the European Union walks a tightrope between increasing military capabilities to support the shared United States and European Union vision outside of Europe, while creating those capabilities simultaneously threatens the European peace within Europe, moving the European Union to create a European hegemon, potentially in competition with the United States. The current level of European Union political integration also limits the effectiveness of European Union Common Security and Defense Policy.<sup>107</sup> European Union Common Security and Defense Policy tries to balance this paradox of power by creating enough capabilities for effectiveness on the global stage, without threatening the balance of power among European Union member states within Europe, and without upsetting the relationship with the United States – a tricky proposition indeed!

## **THE FUTURE OF ATLANTICISM: EMPIRE AND LAMENT OR A SHARED GRAND STRATEGY – BEYOND HEGEMONY**

The greatest threat to American hegemony is the tendency of the United States to retreat from foreign affairs. The founding fathers warned against becoming entangled in European affairs, and that guidance, that grand strategy of isolationism, served the country well for the first one hundred and forty years of its existence. But isolationism has not been relevant to America since 1916 or even before.

Human history from 1500 to 1898 revolved around the European experience and struggle for dominance among European powers. American grand strategy originally developed out of a desire not to participate in those struggles. Aside from the Louisiana Purchase, the War of 1812, and smaller Monroe Doctrine excursions, the relationship isolated Europe and America. Nineteenth century statesmen from the United States, like President John Quincy Adams and Daniel Webster, advocated the benefits of the Europeans believing in the potential and actual power of the United States for the interests of the United States.

However, in 1898 the Americans went to war with a European state, Spain, gaining most of its overseas territories. The United States lost the luxury of isolationism by participating in the age of imperialism and becoming the inevitable empire its geographic reality and economic potential destined it to be, much to the lament of the previous world hegemony, the Europeans. Norman Graebner would argue that the policy focus of the United States lost its solvency in the process.<sup>108</sup>

A structurally dynamic tension between American and European conceptions of identity drove the development and execution of American grand strategy and European reactions to it. Impacting the character of the international system, this tension between American exceptionalism and European exceptionalism both elucidates and sets the structural conditions for a shared culture and society of Atlanticism.

The shared ethnic and cultural–historical identity of America and Europe forever links both sides of the Atlantic. The role of this relationship in the development of American grand strategy provides greater understanding of the historical execution of that strategy as American foreign policy. Further, the historical context for American grand strategy provides relevance and valuable insight into the process of American foreign policy development and its execution as it relates to the future of Atlanticism.

The United States and the European Union security strategies share a common vision of a liberal international world order, but their means for achieving that vision diverge, as do their foreign policies. The United States and the European Union strategies share the outlook that cooperation and engagement keep the peace. The United States believes, however, that a credible threat of the use of force must back up multilateral efforts, while the European Union sees the example of successful multilateral engagement alone as sufficient. Fundamental to this paradox of a common vision, but diverging means, is the type of

international order that currently exists. In some ways, the United States is still operating in a balance of power system, while the European Union is operating in a post-balance system, what Robert Cooper calls a “Post-Modern system.”<sup>109</sup> The challenge is that the world is actually in a transition period between the two systems that started in 1989 with the end of the Cold War. The Europeans are trying to make this new model of security work (cooperation alone), while living in a world that continues to operate by the old rules (cooperation and coercion).<sup>110</sup>

The European Union model works well in the absence of a credible external and existential threat. It keeps the peace in Europe. European elites and politicians favoring European Union institutions tend to argue this point. The United States and the European Union, however, share the strategy of engagement. The foundations of the political order in Europe rest on United States leadership and protection pacifying and stabilizing the region by constraining rivalry among the powers in Europe. The European Union argues that its model of engagement keeps the peace in Europe. Would European Union member states be capable of dealing with the issues of collective defense and security in the absence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United States security commitments? The potential outcomes of removing United States military forces and security commitments from Europe suggest that the answer is no.<sup>111</sup>

The very capabilities needed to project power outside of Europe are illuminating discontinuities in Europe due to divergent concerns of national interests and sovereignty. The European financial crisis highlights these discontinuities among European Union member states. Due to a changing threat environment, European Union member states are reassessing their national interests and their security dependence upon an idea of collective security without the credible military capability to support that ideal should an external threat arise.

Engagement has two faces. Multilateral cooperation is sufficient when economies are strong and growing, and no existential external threat exists. When national interests and threat assessments begin to diverge, however, as they are in the European Union, coercive capabilities are a necessary component to support the credibility of cooperative efforts.

Two future worlds are possible. The first is a continuation of empire and lament. The Europeans may hold onto their outdated conception of European exceptionalism and continue their lament of Anti-Americanism, using it as a rallying point to strengthen European bonds in exclusion of and in opposition to America.<sup>112</sup> Renewed attempts at European Union political integration is one potential outcome of this scenario.<sup>113</sup> Similarly, America may proceed further into unilateral empire as their expeditionary excursions into the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest.<sup>114</sup> Because American identity is so tied to the Manifest Destiny of continual improvement, when something rarely goes wrong, panic and overreaction become the manifestations of American power.<sup>115</sup> The Global War on Terrorism is just such

an example. In these situations, the American empire tends to turn toward unilateralism and away from multilateralism.

The second potential world is an opportunity to realize President Woodrow Wilson's original vision of a liberal global society – a free world.<sup>116</sup> During the last sixty years, wealth and freedom have spread farther and faster across the globe than at any other time in the history of humanity.<sup>117</sup> By working together through cooperative engagement, America and Europe can create a new grand strategy beyond hegemony, a grand strategy that balances realism and idealism.<sup>118</sup> An opportunity exists to create a free world,<sup>119</sup> and to finally realize President Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms: freedoms of speech and religion, and freedoms from want and fear.<sup>120</sup> Atlanticism can lead the way, not as an American idea imposed by empire, nor as a European lament against a good idea just because it was not their own, but rather as a shared vision, a new grand strategy, of a world without the need for hegemony, of a world truly free.

What price sovereignty? The answer to this question holds the key to the future of the European Union and the future of Atlanticism. Without a strategy derived from a shared political vision capable of truly realizing a unified Common Security and Defense Policy for Europe and beyond, with the necessary leadership that perhaps only Germany could provide, a divided set of states of Europe is a more likely outcome than a true European Union.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> I refer to the United States and America interchangeably. When I refer to Europe I predominately mean Western Europe, that group of countries that collectively comprised the “West” during the Cold War, and even more specifically, those countries who historically competed for “Great Power” status (England, France, and Germany, and to a lesser extent Spain and other members of “Club West”).

<sup>2</sup> John L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 44.

<sup>3</sup> Claude Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), 99, 210.

<sup>4</sup> Canada and Australia might also share a similar colonial transformation. The Canadians were torn between their British and French heritage, however, and the Australians derive from a cultural identification of “other,” descending from prisoner outcasts. Only in the United States of America do we find a complete affinity identifying as the same people as their European colonial progenitors. The definition of being American began as *doing* something differently not as *being* something different.

<sup>5</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2010).

<sup>6</sup> *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (2003); *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World* (2008).

<sup>7</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 1-3, 7, 11-13.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 17-50.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>10</sup> *Secure Europe in a Better World*, 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-16.

<sup>14</sup> *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-12.

<sup>16</sup> See, J. Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 199-205; A. de Vasconcelos, ed., *The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on Common Interests* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009); F. Berenkskoetter, “Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of United States and European Security Strategies,” *Security Dialogue* 36 (2005): 71-92; A. Bailes, “The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History,” *SIPRI Policy Paper* 10 (Stockholm: 2005); K. Becher, “Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy,” *European Security* 13 (2004): 345-359; S. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power* (London: Ashgate, 2005); S. Biscop and J. Andersson, eds., *The European Union and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (London: Routledge, 2007); R. Dannreuther and J. Peterson, eds., *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2006); S. Duke, “The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9 (2004): 459-481; F. Heisbourg, *European Union Security Strategy Is Not a Strategy: A European Way of War* (London: Center for European Reform, 2004); G. Quille, “The European Security Strategy: A Framework for European Union Security Interests?,” *International Peacekeeping* 11 (2004): 422-438; A. Toje, “The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 117-133; J. Krause, “Multilateralism: Behind European Views,” *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (2004): 43-59; G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane, eds., *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009).



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- <sup>17</sup> See, N. Witney, "How to Stop the Demilitarization of Europe," *European Council on Foreign Relations* 40 (2011): 1-16.
- <sup>18</sup> See, R. Cooper, "Towards a European Army?," *Lecture Delivered at the Center of the Study of Democracy* (3 June 2004): 1-7.
- <sup>19</sup> *The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1: The Inevitable Empire* (2011), <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110824-geopolitics-united-states-part-1-inevitable-empire>.
- <sup>20</sup> Norman A. Graebner, *Manifest Destiny* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).
- <sup>21</sup> Anders Stephanson, "The Ideology and Spirit of Manifest Destiny," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 150-156.
- <sup>22</sup> *Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1*.
- <sup>23</sup> Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 51-53.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> Graebner, *Manifest Destiny*.
- <sup>26</sup> Stephanson, "The Ideology and Spirit of Manifest Destiny," 150-156.
- <sup>27</sup> *Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1*.
- <sup>28</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 72.
- <sup>29</sup> Walter LaFeber, "Preserving the American System," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 175-183.
- <sup>30</sup> Roger, *American Enemy*, 145.
- <sup>31</sup> George Washington, *Washington's Farewell Address to the People of the United States* (1796), <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/farewell/sd106-21.pdf>.
- <sup>32</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 54.
- <sup>33</sup> Graebner, *Manifest Destiny*; Stephanson, "The Ideology and Spirit of Manifest Destiny."
- <sup>34</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 83-89. President Franklin Roosevelt specifically articulated this view on at least two separate occasions. He remarked to William Bullitt in 1943 that he previously shared this view with President Woodrow Wilson. See William Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life* 30 (1948): 82-88. He also made similar remarks to Averell Harriman in 1944. See Averell Harriman, "Memorandum of Conversations with the President During Trip to Washington, October 21 – November 19, 1944," *Averell Harriman Papers* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1944), Box 175.
- <sup>35</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 7-12.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 12-18. President Franklin Roosevelt commented to Arthur Murray, British Liberal Member of Parliament, that the German build up to inevitable war with France demonstrated the self-serving and destructive nature of the European continental "Great Powers." See Franklin D. Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, 1940, in *President's Secretary's File* (Washington DC: National Archives, 1940), March 4.
- <sup>37</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 89-98.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 98-112.
- <sup>40</sup> See Warren Kimball, "Franklin Roosevelt's Successful Wartime Diplomacy," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 166-176.
- <sup>41</sup> See Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 129-130.

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- <sup>42</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 190-197. Kennan articulated this worldview in a lecture in 1946. See George Kennan, "Measures Short of War," *George F. Kennan Papers*, September 16, 1946 (Princeton: Steeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 1946), Box 16.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 205.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., 312-323. Acheson's diplomatic efforts regarding economic aid to Western Europe during the early 1950s best illustrates his view of American dominance via economic interdependence. See Dean Acheson to Ambassador Dunn, November 8, 1952, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* 6 (1952): 1276-1278.
- <sup>46</sup> For a discussion of the concept of "Soft Power" see Joseph Nye, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 119 (2004): 255-270. For a discussion of the impact of economic interdependence in international relations see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Longman, 2012).
- <sup>47</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 331-341.
- <sup>48</sup> *Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1*.
- <sup>49</sup> Kenneth Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged America's Vital Alliance With Europe* (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), 266.
- <sup>50</sup> I define empire in this way – Geopolitical hegemony beyond a state's core territorial boundaries.
- <sup>51</sup> Woodrow Wilson, "Fighting Is the Slow Way to Peace," in *Address Before the Salesmanship Congress*, Detroit, July 10, 1916 (Washington DC: Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1916), 1480-1482.
- <sup>52</sup> Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through 20th Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 4-5.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 9-12.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., 15-335.
- <sup>55</sup> Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), xvii.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., 1-126.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., 199-210.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., xviii-xix. See also John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999).
- <sup>59</sup> *Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1*.
- <sup>60</sup> Weisbrode, *Atlantic Century*, 266.
- <sup>61</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 205.
- <sup>62</sup> Weisbrode, *Atlantic Century*, 16.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid., 20-21. See also Joachim Krause, "Multilateralism: Behind European Views," *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (2004): 43-59.
- <sup>64</sup> Weisbrode, *Atlantic Century*, 83-128.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., 295-304. A good example of United States State Department diplomats espousing this view is John Kornblum to Martin Hillenbrand, March 11, 1975, in *Martin Hillenbrand Papers*, 1975 (Athens: Richard B. Russell Library, University of Georgia, 1975), Series 3, Box 1, 7.
- <sup>66</sup> Roger, *American Enemy*, x. For the modern manifestations of French anti-Americanism and its implications for French foreign policy see Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins, *France: From the Cold War to the New World Order*

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(London: Macmillan, 1996); Phillip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>67</sup> Roger, *American Enemy*, xiii, 1-29, 33-64.

<sup>68</sup> Andrei S. Markovits, *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 38-81. For the modern manifestations of German anti-Americanism and its implications for German foreign policy see Hans Maull and Sebastian Harnisch, *Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

<sup>69</sup> Roger, *American Enemy*, 129-156.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 447-456.

<sup>71</sup> See Norman A. Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

<sup>72</sup> See William Appleman Williams, "The Open Door Policy: Economic Expansion and the Remaking of Societies," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 12-18.

<sup>73</sup> *The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1.*

<sup>74</sup> See, A. Bailes, "The European Union and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and Defense Policy?," *International Affairs* 84 (2008): 115-130.

<sup>75</sup> Krause, "Multilateralism," 43-59.

<sup>76</sup> See, H. Maull and S. Harnisch, *Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

<sup>77</sup> See, P. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); T. Chafer and B. Jenkins, *France: From the Cold War to the New World Order* (London: Macmillan, 1996).

<sup>78</sup> G. Friedman, *Geopolitical Journey, Part 2: Borderlands* (2010), [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101108\\_geopolitical\\_journey\\_part\\_2\\_borderlands](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101108_geopolitical_journey_part_2_borderlands).

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> G. Friedman, *Geopolitical Journey, Part 3: Romania*, [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101115\\_geopolitical\\_journey\\_part\\_3\\_romania](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101115_geopolitical_journey_part_3_romania).

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> G. Friedman, *Geopolitical Journey, Part 7: Poland*, [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101202\\_geopolitical\\_journey\\_part\\_7\\_poland](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101202_geopolitical_journey_part_7_poland).

<sup>85</sup> A. Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 'New Europe,'" *International Organization* 59 (2005) 973-1012.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 979-982.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 997.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 973-1012.

<sup>90</sup> G. Friedman, *Geopolitical Journey, Part 8: Returning Home* (2010), [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101206\\_geopolitical\\_journey\\_part\\_8\\_returning\\_home](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101206_geopolitical_journey_part_8_returning_home).

<sup>91</sup> R. Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

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- <sup>92</sup> R. Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* 113 (2002), [www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7101](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7101).
- <sup>93</sup> M. Papic and P. Zeihan, *Germany's Choice* (2010), [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100208\\_germanys\\_choice](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100208_germanys_choice).
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>95</sup> See, A. Bailes, "Differential Risk and Threat Perceptions of European Union Members and Their Impact on European Security Cooperation," *Foreign Policy* 29 (2004).
- <sup>96</sup> M. Papic, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Lack of a Strategic Concept* (2010), [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101001\\_NATO\\_lack\\_strategic\\_concept](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101001_NATO_lack_strategic_concept).
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>98</sup> See, *Europe: A Shifting Battleground, Part 1* (2011), [www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110606-europe-shifting-battleground-part-1](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110606-europe-shifting-battleground-part-1).
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>100</sup> See, *Europe: A Shifting Battleground, Part 2* (2011), [www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110606-europe-shifting-battleground-part-2](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110606-europe-shifting-battleground-part-2).
- <sup>101</sup> See, Papic and Zeihan, *Germany's Choice*.
- <sup>102</sup> M. Papic, *The Divided States of Europe* (2011), [www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110627-divided-states-europe](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110627-divided-states-europe).
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>106</sup> See, C. Grant, "Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power?," *Center for European Reform Essays* (London: Center for European Reform, 2009).
- <sup>107</sup> See, A. Menon "European Defense Policy from Lisbon to Libya," *Survival* 53 (2011): 75-90; A. Menon, "Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten," *International Affairs* 85 (2009): 227-246.
- <sup>108</sup> For a discussion of the concept of policy "solvency" see Norman A. Graebner, "The Land-Hunger Thesis Challenged," in *The Mexican War: Was It Manifest Destiny?*, ed. Ramon Ruiz (Boston: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 53.
- <sup>109</sup> See, R. Cooper, *The Post-Modern State and the World Order* (Demos, 2000); R. Cooper, "The Post-Modern State," in *Re-Ordering the World: The Long-Term Implications of September 11*, ed. M. Leonard (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2002).
- <sup>110</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>111</sup> See D. Yost, "Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe," *International Affairs* 78 (2002): 277-300.
- <sup>112</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, 46-85.
- <sup>113</sup> Markovits, *Uncouth Nation*, 201-224.
- <sup>114</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, 84-124.
- <sup>115</sup> *The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 2: American Identity and the Threats of Tomorrow* (2011), <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110825-geopolitics-united-states-part-2-american-identity-threats-tomorrow>.
- <sup>116</sup> Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, 34-38. For differing views of President Woodrow Wilson's vision see Arthur Link, "Wilson's Higher Realism," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 50-55; Thomas J. Knock, "Wilson's Battle for the League: Progressive Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 63-73. Link focuses on President Woodrow Wilson as an individual and Knock focuses on President Woodrow Wilson as a politician.

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<sup>117</sup> Garton Ash, *Free World*, 171.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 170-179.

<sup>119</sup> As defined by Timothy Garton Ash, *Ibid.*, 214-228.

<sup>120</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Development of United States Foreign Policy: Addresses and Messages of FDR* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1942).

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